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I. SUSPICION?
We of the civilized nations sometimes convict people of offenses
we strongly suspect them to have committed, even when we are not
absolutely certain of guilt. We think it barbarous, though, to make a
separate offense out of "being suspicious," here in the sense of behav-
ing in a way that calls down suspicion upon oneself.' Is that so? Is it
barbarous ever to see suspiciousness of behavior as itself a breach of
good order?
A great many Americans suspect that a certain five justices of the
United States Supreme Court, or some of them, acted reprehensibly in
Bush v Gore The suspicion is that these justices, who cast judicial
votes in that case to terminate the process of the year 2000 presiden-
tial election, were prompted to their actions by a prior personal pref-
erence for a Bush victory. The feeling is that they would not have done
the same had the positions of the political parties and their nominees
been reversed in an otherwise identical case-had it been Gore not
Bush whom a Democratic Secretary Harris sought to declare victori-
ous, Bush not Gore seeking recounts from Republican-appointed
judges on the state supreme bench, and so forth.
The suspicion is not baseless. It springs initially from the observa-
tion that the justices who cast the pro-Bush votes include all and only
the five who are commonly identified as composing the conservative
wing of an ideologically polarized Court, and it is girded by certain
t Robert Walsmley University Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Heather
Gerken, Andrew Kaufman, Richard Posner, and L. Michael Seidman for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1 See John H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien
Rggime 47-48 (Chicago 1977) (absolving seventeenth-century Roman-canon law of accusations
of the "barbarous practice" of punishing people not found guilty of anything else for "being sus-
picious"). See also Rex v Haddock, Misl Cas C Law 31 (Herbert, ed 1927) (Frog), reprinted in A.
James Casner and W. Barton Leach, Cases and Text on Property 31 n 2 (Little, Brown 2d ed
1969):
[Clitizens who take it upon themselves to do unusual actions which attract the attention of
the police should be careful to bring these actions into one of the recognized categories of
crimes and offenses, for it is intolerable that the police should be put to the pains of invent-
ing reasons for finding them undesirable.
2 121 S Ct 525 (2000) (per curiam).
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additional observations: the apparent novelty, contentiousness, and
narrowness of the legal grounds supplied for the pro-Bush votes by
those who cast them; the apparent difficulty of mapping the judicial
votes cast, or the legal issues with respect to which they were cast,
onto any cognizable grid of constitutional principles and ideals, or
competing sets of them, that independently might explain the Court's
division over these issues; and the refusal of the conservatives to heed
their liberal colleagues' calls for abstention of the Court from substan-
tial involvement in the election controversy when another branch of
government was constitutionally available to resolve it-that branch
having the clear institutional advantage, with the choice of a president
hanging in the balance, of direct accountability to the electorate. In
part, my purpose here is to see whether these grounds of suspicion are
true or false, apt or inapt. In part, it is to ask "so what if they are true
and apt?"
In the eyes of the public, and surely in the justices' eyes as well,
the current membership of the United States Supreme Court is ideo-
logically polarized. Not for the first time in American history, the Su-
preme Court today appears split into identifiably "conservative" and
"liberal" wings of opinion, outlook, and sensibility. On the basis of
such categorizations, we, and probably they, form our expectations of
how the justices severally will vote when the Court divides over a
wide range of matters. In practice, lawyers make tactical use of these
perceptions, and doubtless justices do too, not to mention presidents
and senators engaged in selecting new justices-although, of course,
there are occasional surprises. No justice currently sitting is consid-
ered nonaligned. While not all are perceived as equally purist or pre-
dictable, and sometimes a justice's particular track record suggests in
advance that he or she may break the usual ranks in a particular sort
of case, each is perceived, by us and doubtless by them, to belong basi-
cally to one or the other wing.'
3 It may not be entirely clear what draws together, into identifiably "conservative" and
"liberal" packages, the sets of positions a justice tends to take on matters as varied as religious
establishment and religious freedom, states' rights and the extent of congressional powers to en-
act social and economic legislation, the scope and status of non-"enumerated" so-called funda-
mental rights of persons (including but not limited to abortion), the scope and strictness of con-
stitutional protection for private property holdings against redistributive or regulatory acts of
government, the scope and strictness of the Constitution's broadly-speaking procedural safe-
guards respecting criminal law enforcement, and the constitutional-legal status of so-called be-
nign race-conscious legislation. Consider Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitu-
tionalism, 88 Mich L Rev 641 (1990). See also J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L J 375, 383 (on "ideological drift").
Maybe ideological polarization of the bench is traceable to some underlying, deep-rooted cleav-
age of temperament. Explaining its origins is not, however, our business here. It's enough for my
purposes that its existence as fact is axiomatic in American political culture.
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Acting at the insistence of a bare majority of the justices, a Su-
preme Court exactly split into the familiar, identifiably ideological
wings threw itself aggressively and decisively into the year 2000 presi-
dential election. As the justices fully knew it would do, the Court's ac-
tion secured for the Republican candidate a victory then otherwise far
from certain-a victory that either might not have been his at all or
might have been his but severely compromised. Had the judicial re-
count proceeded to completion in Florida, Bush might or might not
have been the winner judicially declared. Had he not been, the elec-
tion would have had a materially different outcome from the one
vouchsafed to the country by the ministry of the Supreme Court. Ei-
ther Bush would not now be President, or he'd be President with how-
ever compromised a mandate would have issued from an election de-
cided in Congress and maybe brokered by Congress, on whatever spe-
cial terms of power-sharing, express or implied, would have been the
price. Out of uncertainty's jaws, then, the conservative majority's ac-
tion drew a clean win for the candidate whom any judicial conserva-
tive could fairly be supposed to prefer, other things being in their
minds more-or-less equal.
It is the stark fact of the five-to-four split in Bush v Gore that an-
chors my reflections here. I mean, of course, this particular split, in
which an identifiably conservative-leaning majority, over the protest
of an identifiably liberal-leaning minority, decides a legal case involv-
ing a presidential election on terms that effectively award an other-
wise uncertain victory to the candidate that any judicial conservative
obviously would tend to prefer. It is hard to say whether the fact that
should mainly interest us is that the Court did in fact split along the
familiar ideological divide, over legal issues that do not seem readily
to map onto it,' or rather is that the majority saw fit to proceed once it
saw that such would be the case. Let it be both.
This fact, or these facts, raises several questions worthy of
consideration. First, is what happened remarkable in the slightest
degree? Second, does its having happened give fair reason to suspect
anything wrong about any justice's conduct? Given the actual division
of the subjective views of conservative and liberal justices,
respectively, regarding the legal issues raised by the Bush petitioners,
what honest or good faith alternative, if any, did any justice have to
acting as he or she in fact did act?
4 See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 512 (2000) (application for stay) (Scalia concurring) (stating
that "[t]he counting of votes that are of questionable legality does ... threaten irreparable harm
to... [Bush] ... by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election").
5 See Part II.
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Here I must interrupt my list of questions to mention that an ob-
vious alternative for the Court was abstention, meaning either refusal
of review or dismissal of review once granted without decision on the
merits. That leads to further questions: Third, how strong and clear
were the reasons for abstention? Strong enough to fuel suspicion of
ideologically self-serving motives on the part of a conservative major-
ity that would not yield to them? Fourth, what apt or honorable ex-
planations might there be for the majority's conduct, and are they
compelling enough to dispel suspicion? Fifth, so what?
In what follows, I'll try to keep the focus from time to time on
one or another of the questions in my list. Clean separation will not
always, however, be possible.
II. IDEOLOGY?
There is nothing inherently untoward about a polarized Supreme
Court, by which I mean a Court whose members line up repeatedly
and often predictably in opposing wings having stable memberships.
To find something amiss in that would be to eject ideology from con-
stitutional adjudication in a way that can only be called wrongheaded
in light of our country's long experience with this form of public deci-
sionmaking. Justices arrive at the Court already honestly divided over
sundry major issues of constitutional-legal principle, policy, and pref-
erence. Notwithstanding the futile and embarrassing protestations to
the contrary of some judges and judicial candidates, knowledgeable,
grownup Americans accept the ideological difference as unavoidable
fact consistent with the public-spirited good faith of a judge and we
don't, therefore, normally feel betrayed or aggrieved by its manifesta-
tions.6 We think that there are such things in good people's heads as
"constitutional ideals."7 We think those things can vary, within limits,
among reasonable, good faith American jurists. What less, then, should
we expect of a judge than that she keep her adjudications in line with
her own honest best understanding of the Constitution's aims, values,
and meanings?
Accepting all of that, let me now ask you: Was it, accordingly,
predictable that the Court would split as it did, right along the familiar
conservative/liberal divide, over the particular legal issues raised by
the parties in Bush v Gore? I want you to answer, for now, on impulse
and not after anguished pondering.
If you said "yes," then let me be quick to point out that the divi-
sion was not readily predictable from any liberal/conservative align-
6 See David A. Strauss, Bush v Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U Chi L Rev 737,737
(2001).
7 See text accompanying note 23.
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ment of constitutional ideals, of the kind I have just been describing
and condoning. Taking one by one the issues of law that crucially di-
vided the majority from the dissenters in Bush v Gore, it seems that
ideological alignment either doesn't predict a vote at all or that it pre-
dicts the opposite of the votes cast by conservatives.
Does the use of the word "legislature" in Article II, Section 1,
Clause 2 of the Constitution mean any of the following: that a state
court is in any degree barred from adjudicating claims under the
state's general election code, insofar as applied to elections of presi-
dential electors? or that the state court's statutory-interpretative prac-
tice is, in that context, required to be any different from the same
court's established, accepted, general practice of statutory interpreta-
tion, including its interpretations of the same election code as applied
to all other elections? or that the state court's applications of state
election law are, in such cases, required to proceed in disregard of the
state's constitution or that these interpretations and applications are
subject to a stepped-up, unusual kind and degree of federal judicial
scrutiny?
In response to these questions, three and only three justices con-
cluded that Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 required the national Su-
preme Court, in this case, to substitute its state statutory interpreta-
tions for those of the state's own high court.8 Those three were exactly
the three we'd normally have expected, on ideological grounds, to be
the last and not the first to find such a claim persuasive. Their action in
this instance was not predictable from their known prior stock of con-
stitutional principles and ideals
8 The silence here of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy is fully consistent with suspicion
that they acted in Bush v Gore (a) as judicial conservatives and (b) out of preference for a Bush
presidency. They stood ready to assert other grounds in support of an order terminating the elec-
tion controversy in Bush's favor. They may have wished not to compromise or complicate the
general conservative stance in favor of maximum respect for the dignities of the states including
their judicial branches, see, for example, Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 310 (1989). And they may
have wished to give their action as much protective cover of apparent nonpartisanship as could
be mustered, witness their threadbare claim- ignoring the solid opposition of four justices to any
intervention by the Court at all-of a seven-justice majority in favor of a decision for Bush (but
for an insinuatedly minor disagreement over remedy). See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 533.
9 Once the (unpredictable) decision is made that Article II requires a sharp deviation
from the usual stance of extreme deference to state judiciaries construing state law, then it may
become fairly predictable that some of the Court's most conservative members-being also the
ones most hostile to relatively freewheeling modes of legal interpretation-will be quickest to
find excessive liberality in a state court's treatment of a state statutory election code. See Rich-
ard A. Posner, Florida 2000:A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the En-
suing Litigation, 2000 S Ct Rev 1.
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Fairly read, do the Florida Supreme Court's opinions in the elec-
tion cases '° decide, as a matter of state law, that meeting the "safe har-
bor" date specified by federal statute is a hard-and-fast requirement
of the Florida statutory election code as applied to elections of presi-
dential electors?
Four liberals said "no."" Five conservatives said "yes."'2 Which-
ever to you seems the better response, how could you hope to predict
any judge's answer from his or her membership in one or the other of
the Supreme Court's ideological wings, lacking information about the
concrete electoral outcomes hanging in the balance?
Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause re-
quire use of a standard more specific than manifest intent of the voter
to govern evaluation of contested election ballots by sub-referees re-
porting to a single supervising judge?
The liberals divided over this one, while the conservatives uni-
formly answered yes. So far as I am aware, in no case prior to Bush v
Gore has the Court recognized a claim to unequal protection of voting
rights in which there was on the state's part no explicit or implicit act
of what the jargon calls "classification" -that is, ex ante division of a
population of actual or would-be voters into groups (defined by race,
party, place of residence, wealth, or financial capability) to whose
members the state accords differentially advantageous treatment
within the general voting scheme." This hitherto apparently crucial
element of classification is missing from the Bush v Gore equal pro-
10 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243 (Fla Dec 8,2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct
525; Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220 (Fla Nov 21, 2000), vacd and
remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam).
11 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 541 (Stevens, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, dissenting); id at
543 (Souter, joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens, dissenting); id at 553 (Breyer, joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, dissenting).
12 Id at 533 (per curiam). No legal deadline posed a need for federal judges thus to pre-
clude Florida's high court from speaking for itself on this matter. As Professor McConnell notes,
if-but only if-the Bush majority was right about the Florida court's understanding, an open
remand would certainly have led to the same result as the one secured by the U.S. Supreme
Court's actual order. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v Gore, 68 U
Chi L Rev 657 (2001). In that event, the Florida court itself would soon have ordered all recounts
terminated, retroactively, as of midnight, December 12. Secretary Harris forthwith would have
recertified a Bush victory to Governor Jeb Bush, who forthwith would have certified the Bush
electors to the federal authorities in Washington. The Governor's certificate would have been
signed and arrived after the safe harbor day. So what? What chance was there that a Bush slate
would have undergone a challenge on January 5? For all that was practically at stake, there was
no compelling reason for the Bush v Gore majority to cram an unspoken holding down the
throat of the Florida court.
13 See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 531 ("The idea that one group can be granted greater vot-
ing strength than another is hostile to the one-man, one-vote basis of our representative gov-
ernment."), quoting Moore v Ogilvie, 394 US 814,819 (1969); Richard A. Epstein, "In such Man-
ner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome of Bush v Gore Defended, 68 U Chi L
Rev 613 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U Chi L Rev 757 (2001).
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tection theory, in which the complaint is that identical-looking ballots
cast by sundry atomized individuals might be treated differently by
different counters in the same or different places, although always in a
fair-minded manner and randomly with respect to voter interest or
partisan alignment.
4
I do not here contend that the doctrinal novelty on which the
Bush v Gore majority based its intervention is normatively wrong. My
point is only that as legal doctrine it is novel, newly minted on the
occasion of this case, hitherto-I daresay--widely unsuspected by bar
and bench, and furthermore that it is perceived as problematic from
birth by the very majority that authored it.'" After all, it's not particu-
larly to the Court's conservative ideological wing that you would nor-
mally look for a somewhat daring doctrinal innovation on behalf of
voting rights. Conservative activism on behalf of individual rights
claims has been confined to property rights and rights against ("re-
verse") racial classification. The current conservatives have displayed
no special tenderness for voting rights.
16
Back, now, to my question about the predictability of the Court's
five-to-four split along the familiar ideological boundary. If your im-
pulse-answer to my question was that the split was predictable, you
must impulsively have found it so-this is what I have been arguing-
on the basis of something other than any justice's known commitment
to any cognizable set of "conservative" or "liberal" constitutional
principles or ideals. On the basis of what, then, if not your assumptions
about the election-outcome preferences of known-conservative as op-
posed to known-liberal judges? I don't mean you'd have to be think-
ing that any justice calculatedly or even consciously chose sides on the
crucial legal issues with a view to achieving a preferred electoral out-
come. In retrospect, though, you'd have to be saying at least this: that
justices who could and should have been alert to the danger of bias
from motives extraneous to the legal merits-on even the most ex-
pansive understanding of the legal merits-and who could and should,
14 See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 530-31; Part IV.
15 Allowing that equal protection's application to "election processes generally" presents
"many complexities," the Court took care to confine committed application of its new doctrine
to the "special instance" of "a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial of-
ficer." Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 532. Regardless of whether the Court's "limiting instruction"
proves durable, see Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U Chi L Rev 637 (2001), there
can be no doubt that it was issued.
16 Racial gerrymandering cases, see, for example, Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900 (1995);
Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993), are not to the contrary, being obviously contained within the
same conservative commitment against race-conscious government action that is reflected in
countless cases not involving voting. See, for example, Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US
200 (1995); City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469 (1989).
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furthermore, have been alert to the near-certainty that that is exactly
how a sizeable fraction of the country would view their action later
given the actual lineup of the votes and the transparent contestability
of the grounds, went ahead anyway rather than leave the matter to
Congress.
III. ABSTENTION?
To me, as to many,'7 the majority's action was surprising. Absten-
tion-or dismissal-is the course that, from the beginning, I fully ex-
pected the Court to take, at least in the event that the members found
themselves without clear and compelling grounds for decisive inter-
vention, commanding agreement from some majority other than that
particular (predictable?) majority of five.'8 We cannot fault judges for
giving an ear to what petitioning parties in a case of this magnitude
have to say, or for having their own preliminary looks at the legal is-
sues the parties raise. But preliminary looking is one thing and deci-
sive intervention is another.
It is not as if the Court lacked a proper, honorable alternative to
decisive intervention. The majority's woebegone plea to the con-
trary-"[w]hen contending parties invoke the process of the courts ...
it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and con-
stitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront"' 9-
cannot be sincere. Why is certiorari jurisdiction discretionary, then?
What is a political question?2°
There were obvious considerations of principle, arguing power-
fully for the Supreme Court's abstention in Bush v Gore. The first is a
procedural consideration of gut fairness that Bush partisans have di-
rected loudly against the actions of the Supreme Court of Florida, but
which seems to apply as well to those of the Supreme Court of the
United States. The second is an institutional consideration of profound
significance to the understanding of Americans regarding the question
of who governs in this country.
Speaking first, then, to those who take exception when rule de-
ciders decide the rules after matters have proceeded so far that the
decision obviously determines an outcome to which the deciders are
17 See, for example, Strauss, 68 U Chi L Rev at 740 (cited in note 6).
18 Lacking credibility myself as a shill for the passive virtues in the face of human rights
claims, see Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 111-98 (Yale 2d ed 1986), I can't press to extremes the case for abstention. Had the Bush
petitioners presented the Court with a case involving some evident, grave unfairness, which
clearly applicable and pre-established legal grounds gave it some way to correct rather than re-
enact, I would not be writing this. The point is, they didn't. There is such a thing as going too far.
19 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 533.
20 See IssacharoK 68 U Chi L Rev at 639-41 (cited in note 15).
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perceived to be not indifferent; why not on that ground protest the ac-
tion of the ideologically identifiable majority in Bush v Gore? That
majority intervened aggressively, decisively, and knowingly to resolve
a presidential election in favor of the contestant who had named two
of them as the judicial models by which he would select future justices.
It did so on the basis of a hitherto undeclared and unsuspected doc-
trine of constitutional law,2' which it drew with a remarkable precision
expressly meant to leave its authors unfettered in any future case that
any of them are remotely likely to see in their lifetimes."
Passing now to the question of who governs here, the issues gen-
erally perceived to divide judicial liberals and conservatives are ones
in which the supposedly self-governing people of this country take a
great interest. The Court-that is, its temporally prevailing majori-
ties-to greater and lesser degrees decides these matters for the coun-
try. Some members go so far as to claim for themselves the role of
"speak[ing] before all others" for the "constitutional ideals" of the
country. 3 Shall a current ideological majority of a Court claiming such
powers assume further for itself, then, unnecessarily and gratuitously, a
crucial role in deciding whether relative conservatives or relative lib-
erals are to be in control of its own near-term succession? What could
be more grossly at odds than that with the divided powers, checks and
balances spirit of American constitutional invention?
It is not as if some court had to preside over the election, and the
choice was between which of the two high courts it would be, Florida's
or the nation's. Had the national court kept out of the way, the Florida
judiciary and legislature would have done whatever they were going
to do. In due course, a contested Florida election would have landed
on Congress's doorstep. In the latter event, whatever claims of elec-
21 See text accompanying notes 13-16.
22 See note 15; John Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U Chi L Rev 775,780-81
(2001). Compare Antonin Scalia:
I had always thought that the common-law approach had at least one thing to be said for it:
it was the course of judicial restraint, "making" as little law as possible in order to decide
the case at hand. I have come to doubt whether that is true. For when, in writing for the ma-
jority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, and say, "This is the basis of our decision," I not
only constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have such dif-
ferent facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite the op-
posite, I will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the
governing principle.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175,1179 (1989).
23 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 868 (1992)
(O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter).
24 The Constitution does not in so many words assign to Congress, any more than it does to
the Supreme Court, a responsibility to resolve disputes over the presidential elector election
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toral rights and wrongs were put to the Court could have been put to
Congress and doubtless would have been, very loudly and publicly.
That includes voting right claims. In the course of resolving the elec-
tion, Congress or some part of it might or might not have arrived at
something like a holding on a voting rights or equal protection claim,
whether pressed by opponents or proponents of the state court's re-
count." Had it done so, the Court, on a suitable future occasion, could
have given that holding such value as a precedent as it saw fit.
In a comparison between the five-member, ideologically identifi-
able judicial majority that decided Bush v Gore and whatever parti-
san-political majority, coalition, or machination would have decided
the election in Congress, individual members of either might claim
lack of interest in any dimension of the outcome save getting the mat-
ter resolved according to law, or abstract fairness, or procedural jus-
tice. Members of neither could do so with much credibility. Senators
and representatives have partisanly self-serving reasons to wish their
party in control of the federal executive. Justices of an ideologically
charged and divided Court have ideologically self-serving reasons to
wish their ideological allies in a position to control the coming compo-
sition of the Court. The glaring difference, of course, is that senators
and representatives caring to retain their offices would have had to
face the judgments of voters on their manner of settling the election.
In the circumstances of this case, that is a tremendous advantage of in-
stitutional competency or fitness. Whatever benefit may be claimed in
other settings for the independence of the judiciary, this is one set-
ting-the choosing not only of a political chief executive but of a
maker of future members of the judiciary-in which insulation from
the voters seems just about disqualifying.
All told, then, the Bush v Gore majority pressed ahead in appar-
ent disregard for some obvious and weighty institutional counterindi-
cations. In doing so, they may have caused injury to public confidence
either in the Court's supposed special guardianship of the rule of law
or in the capacity of Congress to carry the burden of political leader-
outcomes. The Twelfth Amendment's provision for electoral vote counting "in the presence" of
the House and Senate is somewhat suggestive, however, as is the choice of the House and Senate
as the forums for resolving failures of any candidate to achieve electoral-vote majorities. Pre-
sumably it was, in part, on the basis of these textual intimations that various Congresses enacted,
and various Presidents signed, the bills now regulating the electoral process in 3 USC §§ 1-15
(1994).
25 The Court itself affirms that Congress in its own house may reach its own conclusions in
matters of constitutional right. See City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 535 (1997) (Kennedy)
(stating that "[w]hen Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just
the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Con-
stitution").
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ship in conditions of constitutional stress.26 On those grounds, many
judge them to have acted extremely badly.
What, then, of the Bush v Gore dissenters? They, no doubt, had
reasons parallel to those of the majority for preferring an opposite
electoral outcome and hence for preferring an opposite legal outcome
in Bush v Gore, meaning any outcome that would have left the events
in Florida to run their course unmolested by the federal judiciary. Still
one cannot reprobate with an even hand, neater though it might be to
do so. The dissenters get an exemption because they all maintain that
the Court should have denied or dismissed the writs of certiorari in
the election cases.27 Granted, the exemption may just be a matter of
the dissenters' moral luck." We cannot know whether their abstemi-
ousness was a matter of principle or rather was an accidental effect of
the fact (assuming it was a fact, I don't know their wishes regarding
the presidential election of 2000) that it was their Gore getting oxed
by the Court's intervention.
In sum, the Court, and the majority as its steward, had both glar-
ingly obvious and publicly respectable reasons of principle for keeping
itself free of substantial, much less decisive, involvement in the elec-
tion controversy. Doing so would have cost the justices some accusa-
tions of cowardice or shirking, but they could have relied confidently
on armies of legal publicists and pundits to explain to the country the
good grounds for their action, just as I am doing here, alas counterfac-
tually." Other things being equal, the case for abstention seems solid
so far.
26 See Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and
the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L Rev 30, 30 (1974) (stating "[i]t seems to me that some of
the added strength of the Court has been achieved-unnecessarily, unfortunately, and un-
wisely-at the expense of the most emaciated and deserving of the three branches, the legisla-
ture").
27 Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 510 (2000); Bush v Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam); Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 512 (2000)
(application for stay); Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525.
28 See Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions 24-38 (Cambridge 1979).
29 Had the Court preferred the assurance or the dignity of speaking these good grounds
for itself, it easily could have done so. It could have granted the writ, denied the stay, ordered ar-
gument as to why the matter should not be classed as a political question unfit for judicial resolu-
tion, and then disposed of it accordingly ("case dismissed") with a full, explanatory opinion,
maybe even including a gesture of confidence in Congress, the Constitution, and the country
looking on.
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IV. OUTRAGE IN FLORIDA?
Suspicion and the grounds for it, as I sketched them near the be-
ginning, are now before us. Are there reassuring explanations for the
majority's conduct that we have yet to consider?
We want and expect judges to correct outrageous injustice, don't
we, even at the cost of smashing a few dishes? Suppose, in November-
December, 2000, a justice is told by a petitioning party that monstrous
injustices are in the course of perpetration in Florida-two of them,
one macro, one micro: on the micro level, a denial to an indefinite
number of voters of the constitutionally protected, fundamental hu-
man right to have one's vote counted equally with those of others; on
a macro level, an injustice to candidate Bush and his political support-
ers (or consider it, if you prefer, an injustice to the country), consisting
of the Florida Supreme Court's illegal swiping from them of a legiti-
mate electoral victory."
Consider first the claim of micro-injustice, the individual rights
claim on which the majority in fact based its intervention. A due re-
gard for the "equal dignity owed to each voter," says the Court, pre-
vents states from valuing any person's vote over any other's. 3' Assum-
ing there had been a petitioning party with clear and genuine standing
to raise such a complaint to which the Court's new equal protection
wrinkle is supposed to be responsive, of exactly what maltreatment
would she have complained? The bottom line answer is: the chance
that her ballot, in the event it fell into a batch submitted to recount,
would undergo appraisal by an intent-of-the-voter standard, honestly
applied by whomever would be applying it. True, her ballot stands pos-
sibly to be rejected by the official who happens to be the one to pick it
up, whereas it might have been accepted if another official had been
the one to pick it up first, because of differing rules of thumb in use by
the two, each of them reasonably and impartially adopted and applied.
These are eventualities about which our voter will never know, and it
is not clear why she has any reason to care about them, either, given
that the anticipated vagaries of ballot appraisal are utterly random
with respect to partisan voter interest.
On the record before the Court in Bush v Gore, there was
nothing going on more oppressive or nefarious than that. In Bush v
Gore, to go by the doctrinal proposition there declared, the majority
intervened not on behalf of would-be Gore voters whose votes were
being weeded out by biased Republican counters, or would-be Bush
voters whose votes were being weeded out by biased Democratic
30 David Strauss disapprovingly explains the decision as prompted by a perception of this
sort of macro-injustice. See Strauss, 68 U Chi L Rev at 755 (cited in note 6).
31 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 529-30.
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counters. All they found legally wrong was that the intent-of-the-voter
standard-they thought unnecessarily-allows different honest count-
ers, or groups of them, to make different dispositions of identical bal-
lots, on a basis that is utterly random with respect to voter interest.3
No one's equal dignity is impugned by this practice, and only Humpty
Dumpty would describe it as valuing one person's vote over an-
other's. 33 Is this a human rights emergency? I would like you even to
put a name to the human right undergoing violation here.-4
Remember, the issue for the moment is not whether the best the-
ory of electoral administration, or the best theory of political justice,
requires a strict by-the-numbers rule for the hand counting of con-
tested punchcard ballots. It is whether higher duties of protection of
the fundamental rights of persons compelled the Supreme Court's in-
tervention in this case, against otherwise compelling reasons to the
contrary. Why should we not be suspect when conservative justices
suddenly forget their own characteristic insistence that the Supreme
Court "need not ... inject itself into every field of human activity
where irrationality and oppression may theoretically occur"3' - in a
case, of all cases, where a presidential election hangs in the balance?
What of the claimed macro-injustice? The per curiam opinion in
Bush v Gore-the only one to draw support from a majority of the
Court-makes no reference to any such thing, being grounded solely
on the proposition of an individual right to an equally counted and
weighted vote. But we can't on that account dismiss the macro-
injustice claim, because what we're trying to do just now is to see
whether the Bush v Gore majority had an honorable or commendable
ground for its action, which we should allow may not necessarily mean
a ground it could prudently mention in public. Still, questions do come
to mind. It's not just a given, after all, that the alleged macro-
injustice -a subversion of the election by a reckless or larcenous Flor-
ida Supreme Court-was in fact occurring. The judicial minority in
32 Id at 529-32.
33 See note 13.
34 How about the right to associate freely and equally with others in securing the election
of your candidate of choice? That would make the Court's equal protection ruling into a new-
fangled protection against vote dilution-a hard thing to foist on the justices who elsewhere
have concluded that vote dilution claims are far too lost in political theory to be justiciable. See
Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 892-94 & n 1 (1994) (Thomas, joined by Scalia, concurring) (main-
taining that it is error to read either Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Equal Protection
Clause to cover dilution claims because such claims are beyond the proper adjudicative capaci-
ties of courts).
35 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261, 300-01 (1990) (Scalia
concurring). Justice Scalia went on immediately to add "and if it tries to do so it will destroy it-
self," id, a point on which I don't insist.
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Bush v Gore did not think that it was, rather finding the Florida court
to be acting within the bounds of a nonpartisan legal reason.6 With the
matter in that posture, why not leave it-it was a presidential election,
for crying out loud-to Congress?
V. SALVATION?
A justice might lack confidence that Congress could manage the
election imbroglio fairly, or without inflicting grave harm on the coun-
try. He or she might believe that members of Congress lack the temer-
ity to withstand public pressure to hand the presidency to Gore, in
case the Florida court's recount gave Gore the larger number of votes,
in disregard of legitimate complaints about that recount from the
Bush side; or that they otherwise lack motivation or skill to conduct
the election dtnouement in a manner likely to sustain public confi-
dence in the basic decency, fairness, or good sense of the outcome; or
that a congressional resolution would be so long delayed as to jeop-
ardize national security interests or the preservation of governmental
order; or that the country's general welfare cannot risk four years of a
presidency scarred and weakened from birth by protracted partisan-
political infighting required to create it. We easily may imagine a jus-
tice convinced beyond doubt, on grounds such as these, that the nation
desperately needs a clean termination now to the year 2000 election.
Believing that only the Supreme Court can give the country what
it needs, our justice would be caught in a paradox.37 The Court's
unique ability to produce a clean termination depends on the coun-
try's habit of unquestioning obedience to its rulings, and that habit, in
the view of our justice," depends on the country's belief that whatever
the Court rules, it rules for reasons of law. If the Court stands openly
before the country in the posture of a Regent, assuming dictatorial
powers to tide us over an interregnal gap, the country will not heed it
and the salvational project will fail. Thus, as our justices see matters,
the Court-the governmental chamber expected beyond all others
never to act for reasons other than the very ones it announces-
cannot accomplish its national salvational end by saying up front that
national salvation, not the law, is its reason for acting as it does.
Reasons having the form of plausible legal grounds will, there-
fore, have to be produced by the Court to explain its actions, regard-
less of whether one or another justice believes them to be true and
36 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 546-49 (Ginsburg, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, dis-
senting).
37 Compare Louis M. Seidman, This Essay is Brilliant / This Essay is Stupid: Positive and
Negative Self-Reference in Constitutional Practice and Theory, 46 UCLA L Rev 501, 522-24
(1998) (writing of "the trap of self-knowledge that makes contradiction inevitable").
38 As in the view of Professor Yoo. See Yoo, 68 U Chi L Rev at 777-78 (cited in note 22).
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adequate legal grounds. The Court, moreover, will have to do the best
it can to frame these faux-legal reasons extremely narrowly with a
view to minimizing any risk of wreckage to the full body of constitu-
tional-legal doctrine. And the Court, finally, if it's going to undertake
this clean-termination project at all, will have to undertake it on be-
half of the candidate who leads in the official vote tally at the instant
of the Court's decisive intervention, which must not be much longer
delayed. That means candidate Bush, as it happens. So the justice
we're imagining doesn't choose Bush because she likes Bush better
than Gore. He or she would have done the same for Gore-for the
country, really-had the positions been reversed.
That is a possible account of what happened in Bush v Gore. It is
not without its own problems of credibility, but one might believe it. If
it occurs to you to wonder why five conservative justices would see
matters in the way I've just described, while four liberal justices would
not, you should attend carefully to Professor Pildes's explanation of
why indeed they might.39 If Pildes does not persuade you, you ought
still to be willing to allow that it might, after all, in this instance be the
conservatives who are having the moral luck.4°
Insofar as you think members of the Bush v Gore majority may
have acted on a basis something like what I've just sketched, suspicion
for you is at an end-suspicion, I mean, that the majority justices were
prompted to the actions they took by prior personal preference for a
Bush victory. Repugnance, however, may still be going strong, for you
possibly may think-as I tend to-that intentional judicial conduct of
the kind I've just been sketching would have been arrogant, rash, mis-
calculated, even profoundly anticonstitutional and even bearing in
mind that the Constitution is not a suicide pact. Of course, the conduct
could have been all those things and still not shameless or depraved.
The justices of the Bush v Gore majority might be imagined as Ma-
chiavelli's new prince, a ruler and savior prepared to sacrifice all to
save the imperiled republic-probity, reputation, even the salvation of
an honored place in history.4'
39 See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U Chi L Rev 695 (2001).
40 See note 28 and accompanying text.
41 See Sebastian De Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell 217-40 (Princeton 1989). Compare Posner,
2000 S Ct Rev at 54 (cited in note 9) ("Judges unwilling to sacrifice some of their prestige for the
greater good of the nation might be thought selfish.").
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Princes for judges. Is that what Americans want? Would that be
keeping the faith?
I mean these questions in earnest. The answers, alas, are not obvi-
42OUS.
42 For my further consideration of these questions, see Frank I. Michelman, Machiavelli in
Robes? The Court in the Election, Colin Thomas Ruagh O'Fallon Lecture at the University of
Oregon (forthcoming Apr 9,2001). For starters, chew on the following. A Gallup Poll found that
fully one half of respondents to a survey taken December 15-17, 2000, believed the justices'
votes were "influenced by their personal political views." Yet of the respondents who disagreed
with the decision (49 percent), almost two-thirds (32 vs 17 percent) "accepted" it. The poll is re-
ported at <http://www.cnn.comI20O/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/18/cnn.poll/index.html> (visited
Feb 25,2001).
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